On Empirical Equivalence and Duality by De Haro, Sebastian
On Empirical Equivalence and Duality
Sebastian De Haro
Trinity College, Cambridge, CB2 1TQ, United Kingdom1
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge
Vossius Center for History of Humanities and Sciences, University of Amsterdam
sd696@cam.ac.uk
‘A science can never determine its subject-matter except up to an isomorphic
representation’ (Hermann Weyl, 1934).
April 13, 2020
Abstract
I argue that, on a judicious reading of two existing criteria—one syntactic and the other
semantic—dual theories can be taken to be empirically equivalent. The judicious reading
is straightforward, but leads to the surprising conclusion that very different-looking theo-
ries can have equivalent empirical content. And thus it shows how a widespread scientific
practice, of interpreting duals as empirically equivalent, can be understood by a thus-far
unnoticed feature of existing accounts of empirical equivalence.
1To appear in Hundred Years of Gauge Theory, S. De Bianchi and C. Kiefer (Eds.), Springer, for the
centenary of the publication of Hermann Weyl’s Raum-Zeit-Materie.
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2
1 Introduction
The phenomenon of duality has been a central topic in theoretical physics for several
decades. A duality is an isomorphism between (possibly very different-looking) theories,
and so dualities are powerful tools for theory construction.2 They are also very useful in
describing empirical phenomena that would otherwise be intractable.
The main question that I will address in this paper is whether dual theories are, or can
be taken to be, empirically equivalent—as physicists often claim that they are—on the
existing criteria of empirical equivalence. Given that a duality in physics is, in essence,
an isomorphism between theories, this question reminds us of Weyl’s question of whether
physics can determine its own subject-matter—to which he answered that this is only
possible up to isomorphism.3
My motivation is two-fold. First—as I will argue in a moment—empirical equiva-
lence is an aspect of dualities that has remained relatively under-developed in the recent
philosophical discussions, compared to the rich extant analyses of theoretical equivalence
(sometimes also called ‘physical equivalence’); and yet it is often presupposed by those
analyses. Second, physicists commonly say that dual theories are empirically equivalent,
and standardly use this in their theoretical constructions: so that, without an account
that explains how duals can be empirically equivalent, this important scientific practice
would be unintelligible.4
About the first motivation: while the recent philosophical discussion of dualities has
focussed on the analysis of theoretical equivalence, it has for the most part assumed that
dual theories are empirically equivalent, without normally being explicit about a detailed
criterion of empirical equivalence, and without arguing that, in general, two duals are
empirically equivalent under that criterion.5 For example, Fraser (2017: p. 1) writes that
‘dual theories are regarded as not merely empirically equivalent, but physically equivalent’,
and discusses an example of a formal equivalence between Euclidean field theory and
relativistic quantum field theory, in which ‘the type of equivalence that obtains... goes
well beyond empirical equivalence, but falls short of physical equivalence’ (p. 2). Also,
Read (2016: p. 213) and Le Bihan and Read (2018: p. 2) cite van Fraassen’s (1980) notion
of empirical equivalence, and take empirical equivalence as a necessary condition for two
theories to be dual. And, while I agree with these papers, I also suggest that one needs to
explain how dual theories can be empirically equivalent, according to the standard criteria
of empirical equivalence—or to explain how these criteria need to be modified, in order
2Isomorphisms, in a sense different to the one used here, are also discussed in the literature on
scientific representation. On the semantic view, models represent their target systems in virtue of their
being isomorphic to them (other morphisms are sometimes also used). See for example French (2003)
and Frigg and Nguyen (2016). For a discussion in the context of ontic structural realism, see French and
Ladyman (1999: p. 108).
3Weyl (1934: pp. 95-96); see also p. 129.
4Empirical equivalence is also essential in discussions of empirical under-determination in connection
with scientific realism. I take this up in De Haro (2020): and so, I will not pursue it further here.
5Arguments for empirical equivalence have of course been given in specific examples. For electric-
magnetic duality, see Dieks et al. (2015: pp. 209-210) and Weatherall (2019: Section 3); for T duality, see
Huggett (2017) and Butterfield (2018: Section 6.3); for gauge-gravity dualities, see De Haro (2017: pp. 116-
117) and Dawid (2017: pp. 24-26).
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to get empirical equivalence of dual theories. In other words, empirical equivalence is not
automatic, and needs to be argued for.6
About the second motivation: it would be desirable to have an account of empirical
equivalence that can be applied more generally to modern theories of physics. To this
end, there are two broad traditional accounts of the notion of empirical equivalence in the
philosophical literature that are useful: of which one is syntactic (see for example Quine
1970, 1975) and the other semantic (see for example van Fraassen 1980, 1989). Thus
it would be of considerable interest to see whether or not they give the same verdicts
for dualities. For example, some—though not all—recent accounts of theoretical equiva-
lence, notably Weatherall (2016, 2019), give verdicts of empirical equivalence in specific
examples, but without making explicit the connection with these accounts of empirical
equivalence. And thus it seems important, for these accounts of theoretical equivalence
and for modern theories of physics generally, to see whether the syntactic and semantic
accounts of empirical equivalence involve any significant differences.
Thus my project starts with a comparison of the criteria of empirical equivalence that
are given by the syntactic and semantic conceptions of theories. I will do this in Lutz’s
(2017) spirit of reconciliation between the two: indeed my argument will be that, although
the two criteria of empirical equivalence give prima facie different verdicts in various cases,
on a deeper—and perhaps surprising—analysis they can be reconciled. The analysis in
question is suggested by dualities.
At first sight, the syntactic criterion of empirical equivalence appears to be stronger
than the semantic criterion because, while the former requires identity of observational
sentences, the latter requires only isomorphism of models. Indeed, this distinction be-
tween identity and isomorphism is not innocuous: and it partly motivates van Fraassen’s
(1980) adoption of the more liberal semantic, as against the stricter syntactic, criterion.
And since dualities are isomorphisms rather than identities, dual theories are empirically
inequivalent by a straightforward application of the syntactic criterion: while empirically
equivalent by the semantic criterion. In Section 4, I will motivate the judicious reading
of van Fraassen’s (1980, 1989) criterion which leads to this verdict, as a surprising but
straightforward new application of his proposal.
But, as I announced, the two views can be reconciled: and this entails a new application
of the syntactic criterion of empirical equivalence, to a different pair of theories: namely,
a theory T and its “reinterpreted dual”, T ′, such that these two theories—one of which
is reinterpreted using the duality—are empirically equivalent.
Thus the semantic and syntactic criteria can be made to give the same verdicts:
through a judicious reading of the semantic criterion, and applying the syntactic criterion
6For a discussion of empirical equivalence in the context of category theory, see Weatherall (2019).
Although Weatherall appears to stress the lack of empirical equivalence more than I do, we both argue
that “duals are not automatically empirical equivalent”, and we both conclude that it is nevertheless
possible to view dual theories as empirically equivalent. The present paper, specifically, works out how
two duals can be empirically equivalent on the syntactic and semantic conceptions. Another author worth
mentioning is Dawid (2017: p. 28), who argues that empirical equivalence takes on a different role in string
theory than it traditionally does in the scientific process: namely, as an indicator of important constraints
on theory construction, that he argues is not fully visible in the classical limit. For a discussion of Dawid’s
views in relation to mine, see De Haro (2020: Section 4.2).
4
to a different pair of theories.
Underlying this possibility of using the duality to “change the interpretation” is the
idea that formal theories admit various interpretations, and that the discovery of a duality
can be a good reason to reinterpret a given theory—especially if such a reinterpretation
is motivated by scientific practice. This, then, not only agrees with, but also explains, a
fruitful and widespread scientific practice. Indeed, I believe that a conception of the crite-
ria of empirical equivalence that did not allow for dual theories to be empirically equivalent
would render the importance of dualities, in current theoretical physics, philosophically
unintelligible.
In Section 2, I review Quine’s syntactic and van Fraassen’s semantic conceptions of
empirical equivalence. Then, in Section 3, I briefly introduce duality, and illustrate it
in some examples. Section 4 brings the two topics together, and finds that dual theo-
ries can—surprisingly—be taken to be empirically equivalent. Section 5 summarises the
paper’s main thesis.
2 Empirical Equivalence
In this Section, I review the two criteria of empirical equivalence that I will compare
in Section 4: Quine’s (1970, 1975) syntactic, and van Fraassen’s (1980, 1989) semantic
criterion.
Quine (1975: p. 319) says that two theories are empirically equivalent if they imply
the same observational sentences—also called ‘observational conditionals’—for all possible
observations: present, past, future7 or ‘pegged to inaccessible place-times’.8 He puts it
thus:
The empirical content of a theory formulation is summed up in the observation
conditionals that the formulation implies (Quine 1975: p. 323).
Quine does not tell us, in either of his two papers on empirical under-determination (1970,
1975), what he means by ‘observation’. But there are of course a few general things one
can say. First, his views on observation were formed against the background logical posi-
tivist view that observation ultimately reduces to human sense data. However, his views
would not have entailed stronger logical positivist doctrines such as Carnap’s reduction
of theoretical terms to observational terms. He summarises his empiricist commitments
thus: ‘Two cardinal tenets of empiricism remained unassailable... and so remain to this
day. One is that whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence. The other...
is that all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence’
(2002: p. 249). His mention of ‘inaccessible place-times’ (1975: p. 234) suggests that,
by observation, he had something broader in mind than mere perception by the human
senses—but what, he does not say.
Another influential account of the meaning of ‘empirical’ is by van Fraassen (1980: p. 64):
7Quine (1970: p. 179).
8Quine (1975: p. 234). One area where inaccessible place-times appear is of course cosmology. See
Glymour (1977), Malament (1977) and Manchak (2009), who discuss the under-determination of topology
by local geometric structure.
5
To present a theory is... to present certain parts of those models (the empirical
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena.
The structures which can be described in experimental and measurement reports
we call appearances: the theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such
that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model.
Van Fraassen famously restricts the scope of ‘observable phenomena’ to observation by
the unaided human senses. Accordingly, his mention of ‘experimental and measurement
reports’ is restricted in the kinds of experiments and measurements that it affords. Thus
I will set van Fraassen’s notion of observability aside but keep his notion of empirical
adequacy as a useful semantic alternative to Quine’s syntactic construal of the empirical.9
Van Fraassen’s (1980: p. 67) notion of empirical equivalence also involves consideration
of the theory’s models: namely, the structures that satisfy the theorems of the theory;
alternatively, the structures that comprise the theory, regarded as a collection of mod-
els. It is the empirical substructures of those models that ‘are candidates for the direct
representation of observable phenomena’ (1980: p. 64). Thus two theories, T and T ′, are
empirically equivalent if for every model M of T there is a model M ′ of T ′ such that
all empirical substructures of M are isomorphic to empirical substructures of M ′, and
vice-versa.
To summarise: two theories are empirically equivalent if they imply the same
observational sentences (on Quine’s syntactic conception) or if the empirical substructures
of their models are isomorphic to each other (on van Fraassen’s semantic conception).
3 Duality
This Section introduces the notion of duality, and gives two examples that I will use in
my analysis of empirical equivalence in Section 4.10
A duality is an isomorphism between two theory formulations. I will denote the duality
map by d : T → T ′, where T and T ′ are two bare theories, i.e. before we give them a
physical interpretation. The duality maps (isomorphically) the states of T to the states
of T ′, and likewise for their quantities: while preserving the values of the quantities, the
dynamics, and the symmetries that are stipulated for T and T ′.11
An interpretation can be modelled using the idea of an interpretation map: namely,
a partial function mapping bits of a bare theory (paradigmatically: the states and the
quantities) into the theory’s domain of phenomena. I will denote such a map by: i : T →
D.12
9For an account of observation that, in my opinion, resonates better with modern science, see Lenzen
(1955).
10A detailed Schema for dualities is presented in De Haro (2016) and De Haro and Butterfield (2018).
Further work on dualities is in Dieks et al. (2015), Huggett (2017), Read and Møller-Nielsen (2018), and
Rickles (2017).
11For the relation between symmetry and duality, see De Haro and Butterfield (2019).
12For a detailed exposition of interpretations in terms of maps, the conditions they satisfy, and how
this can be used for referential semantics semantics, see De Haro and Butterfield (2018) and De Haro
(2016, 2017).
6
Figure 1: A lattice (solid lines) and its dual lattice (broken lines). Left: square lattice. Right:
honeycomb lattice. Baxter (1982), with permission.
Consider, for example, orthodox quantum mechanics, as often presented in textbooks.
Its interpretation map, i, maps the bare theory to its domain of phenomena as follows:
i(x) = ‘the position, with value x, of the particle upon measurement’
i
(|ψ(x)|2) = ‘the probability density of finding the particle at position x, upon measurement’
etc., where x is an eigenvalue of the position operator. Thus the eigenvalues of self-adjoint
operators are interpreted as possible outcomes of individual measurements. The absolute
value squared of wave-functions are interpreted as Born probabilities, etc.
Notice that not everything that is contained in the domain D (such as: outcomes of
measurements, Born probabilities, physical states of a system, etc.) counts as ‘empirical’.
The values of quantities for a given state are typically observable, but the states them-
selves are not. This motivates the identification, for quantum mechanics, of van Fraassen’s
empirical substructures with the set of transition amplitudes of self-adjoint operators, and
the expressions in which they appear.
I will llustrate duality in the example of Kramers-Wannier duality in statistical me-
chanics. Consider the Ising model on a square lattice (see Figure 1).13 Each lattice site,
i.e. each vertex of the lattice, is occupied by a spin σi (where i labels the lattice sites)
with two possible values: +1 or −1. Two nearest-neighbour spins σi and σj contribute a
potential energy −J σi σj, where J is some fixed energy, and the total energy is the sum
over all such pairs.
The partition function is defined as the sum of the exponentials of the energy (Boltz-
mann factors), summed over all the states. Thus for a square lattice of N sites, we sum
the exponentials of the energies of the pairs:
ZN :=
∑
σ
e−E(σ)/kBT =
∑
σ
exp
K∑
(i,j)
σi σj
 =: e−N FN ,
where we sum over pairs (i, j), i.e. all edges (nearest-neighbour pairs of spins). The sum
over σ is the sum over all spin values, ±1. Furthermore, I have defined K := J/kBT ,
13I follow the treatment in Baxter (1982: Section 6.2) and Savit (1980: pp. 456-457).
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where kB is Boltzmann’s constant and T is the temperature. On the right is the definition
of the free energy, FN .
Kramers-Wannier duality involves a reinterpretation of the spin variables, as belonging
to the ‘dual lattice’, which one gets by placing points at the centres of the faces of the
original lattice, and connecting the points in adjacent faces (i.e. faces that share an edge):
see Figure 1. The result, for the square lattice, is that the original Ising model (with
weight K) and the Ising model on the dual lattice (with weight K∗) are related to each
other in the limit that the lattice is infinite, i.e. N →∞. First, one defines the free energy
in the limit of infinite N :
F(K) := lim
N→∞
FN = − lim
N→∞
1
N
lnZN , (1)
and then one derives the following tranformation property of the free energy:
F(K∗) = F(K) + ln sinh 2K (2)
tanhK∗ := e−2K .
Thus the free energies of the two models are equal, up to ln sinh 2K. Notice that the K →
∞ limit of one model maps, through Eq. (2), to the K∗ → 0 limit of the other, and vice-
versa. Alternatively, since K and K∗ depend on the temperatures T and T ∗, respectively,
the Ising model at high temperature is dual to the Ising model at low temperature, and
vice-versa.
This is the basic idea of Kramers-Wannier duality: there is a well-defined one-to-one
map between the two models (the high-temperature and the low-temperature Ising mod-
els, with their specific weights) such that the free energies of the two models and all other
quantities map onto each other, through Eq. (2). Furthermore, this map generalises to
other quantities of interest, such as the correlation functions, 〈σi σl〉, between spins σi and
σl that may be arbitrarily far away from each other (see Savit 1980: p. 457). If this map
generalises to all the quantities of interest in the theory, which depend on arbitrary spin
states, then it is an isomorphism between the two theories—it is a duality.
My second example of a duality is gauge-gravity duality, which was used in the RHIC
experiments in Brookhaven, NY. The duality successfully relates the four-dimensional
quantum field theory (QCD, quantum chromodynamics) that describes the quark-gluon
plasma, produced in high-energy collisions between lead atoms, to the properties of a
five-dimensional black hole. The latter was employed to perform a calculation that, via
an approximate duality, provided a result in QCD: namely, the shear-viscosity-to-entropy-
density ratio of the plasma, which could not be obtained in the theory of QCD describing
the plasma. Thus a five-dimensional black hole is used to describe, at least approximately,
an entirely different (four-dimensional!) empirical situation.
4 Empirical Equivalence of Dual Theories
In this Section, I will apply the syntactic and semantic criteria of empirical equivalence,
from Section 2, to cases of duality. The application will involve a judicious reading of
these criteria.
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T1
d←→ T2yi1 yi2
D1
d˜←→ D2
Figure 2: Empirical equivalence. There is an induced duality map, d˜, between the domains.
My ‘judicious reading’ is liberal but also straightforward, and it has two motivations.
First, it captures an important scientific practice of using dualities to construct new theo-
ries that describe empirically equivalent situations, as in the RHIC experiment, discussed
at the end of the previous Section. Second, the judicious reading is independently mo-
tivated by a historical-critical analysis of van Fraassen’s semantic criterion of empirical
equivalence. And I will claim that it casts light on some of the alleged differences between
the semantic and syntactic views of theories.
On the syntactic criterion, two theories are empirically equivalent if they imply the
same observational sentences. Since a duality is an isomorphism, d : T → T ′, between two
theories whose domains of phenomena can be very different, dual theories imply different
observational sentences, and are in general not empirically equivalent in this sense. On
their ordinary interpretations,14 QCD and the five-dimensional gravitational theory make
different predictions, even though the numerical values of their quantities agree. And
under Kramers-Wannier duality, a high-temperature lattice maps to a low-temperature
lattice (alternatively, strong coupling K is mapped to weak coupling K∗, according to
Eq. (2)). Thus their observational sentences differ.
On the semantic criterion, two theories are empirically equivalent if the empirical
substructures of their models are isomorphic to each other (cf. the end of Section 2).
Notice that it is ‘isomorphism’ of the empirical substructures of the theory’s models,
rather than ‘identity’, that counts here—and I will argue in Section 4.1 that this literal
reading of van Fraassen is indeed correct. Thus let me take van Fraassen’s quote from
Section 2 literally, and look for a suitable isomorphism between the empirical substructures
of the models that we consider. Since we are dealing with dualities, the suggestion is
that the duality map gives a natural—though surprising—new candidate for such an
isomorphism: which I will dub the ‘induced duality map’.
Thus consider the case in which the dual theories’ domains of phenomena are distinct
but isomorphic, according to an ‘induced duality map’, d˜ : D1 → D2. The commuting
diagram in Figure 2 will not always close (the condition for its closure is that i2 ◦ d =
d˜ ◦ i1; cf. De Haro, 2019: Section 2.2.3). But if it does, then the two theories are clearly
empirically equivalent on van Fraassen’s conception taken literally.
For Kramers-Wannier duality, the map d˜ replaces a lattice by its dual, and translates
the value of the temperature from one to the other. In the case of the RHIC experiments,
14Dieks et al. (2015) and De Haro (2016, 2017) call this an ‘external’ interpretation, where the mean-
ing of the terms is fixed from outside the theory. The reinterpretations discussed below are ‘internal’
interpretations, which take the duality as a starting point for establishing the meanings of the terms.
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the calculations are done in the five-dimensional theory, and then they are translated
(using the induced duality map) into predictions about the four-dimensional plasma.
Thus on this literal reading of van Fraassen, the dualities that we have discussed do
in fact (and surprisingly!) relate empirically equivalent theories, by a reinterpretation of
their domains of phenomena. What prima facie looks like a five-dimensional black hole
can, through the induced duality map, be reinterpreted as a four-dimensional plasma.
The same holds of course if we consider Newtonian mechanics with different stan-
dards of rest (an example that van Fraassen himself considers). According to Newton and
Clarke, different standards of rest give different empirical situations: but they are iso-
morphic situations, because any standard of rest can be mapped to any other by a Galilei
transformation. And so, different standards of rest give empirically equivalent situations
on van Fraassen’s criterion (as in Leibniz).15
Thus van Fraassen’s semantic criterion—because it involves isomorphism, rather than
identity, of substructures—seems more liberal than the syntactic criterion. By Quine’s cri-
terion, the examples of dualities are not cases of under-determination; by van Fraassen’s,
they are. This prompts two questions, the first of which leads to the second:
(A) Is my interpretation of van Fraassen’s notion of empirical equivalence correct?
Does his notion allow for isomorphisms that involve dualities?
(B) Can the syntactic notion of empirical equivalence also allow the same latitude?
4.1 Van Fraassen on empirical equivalence
As to question (A): the evidence that my interpretation is straightforward is from van
Fraassen’s (1980, 1989). First, in his famous example of the seven point geometry
(1980: p. 43) that motivates the semantic notion of a ‘model’, he writes that ‘the seven-
point structure can be embedded in a Euclidean space. We say that one structure can be
embedded in another, if the first is isomorphic to a part (substructure) of the second’.
In (1989: pp. 219-220), he adds: ‘This relation [of isomorphism] is important because it
is also the exact relation a phenomenon bears to some model of a theory, if that theory
is empirically adequate.’ Why does van Fraassen use—even emphasise—‘embedding’ and
‘isomorphism’,16 rather than just saying that ‘the seven-point structure... is equal to, or
is the same as, a part of Euclidean space’? Like isomorphism, an embedding is a math-
ematical notion: an embedding essentially comes down to an injective map, such that
when restricted to the image set of the map, the map thus obtained is an isomorphism.17
His use of both ‘isomorphism’ and ‘embedding’, rather than the more straightforward
‘equality’, or ‘sameness’, implies that he means isomorphism and embedding: so that the
literal reading is correct—and his second quote clarifies that isomorphism is important
not only because this is how models relate to one another, but also with their empirical
adequacy.
15For a discussion of this example as a case of duality, see Butterfield (2019) and De Haro and Butterfield
(2019).
16Van Fraassen (1980, 1989) is constant in his use of ‘isomorphism’ in connection with empirical equiv-
alence.
17For a typical definition in the context of topology, see for example Munkres (2000: p.105).
10
Second, van Fraassen (1980: pp. 45-50) discusses the empirical adequacy of Newton’s
theory of mechanics and gravitation, and the empirical equivalence of the alternatives to
this theory with the additional postulate that the centre of gravity of the solar system
has constant absolute velocity v (he denotes these theories by ‘TN(v)’):
When Newton claims empirical adequacy for his theory, he is claiming that his
theory has some model such that all actual appearances are identifiable with (iso-
morphic to) motions in that model’ (p. 45, his italics).
The use of ‘isomorphism’ is here essential:
all the theories TN(v) are empirically equivalent exactly if all the motions in a model
of TN(v) are isomorphic to motions in a model of TN(v + w) (p. 46, his italics).
There can be no doubt that it is the isomorphism of the motions between TN(v) and
TN(v + w) that makes the theories empirically equivalent, regardless of the value of w.
And in so far as one member of the family is empirically adequate (cf. p. 47), the whole
family is empirically adequate. (He also argues that Maxwell’s theories with different
absolute velocities are empirically equivalent.)
But if all these theories count as empirically equivalent, then we should count other
theories that are related by a similar isomorphism, of the state-spaces and quantities
(i.e. dualities), as empirically equivalent.
But there is more evidence in support of my reading. For the semantic view’s use of
‘isomorphism’ in its conception of empirical adequacy underpins van Fraassen’s (1980: pp. 53-
56) preference for the semantic over the syntactic approach. Van Fraassen claims that the
syntactic approach judges the theories TN(v) with different values of the velocity v to be
empirically inequivalent, i.e. the syntactic approach distinguishes between the empirical
consequences of theories for which there should be no such distinction:
[On the syntactic approach,] TN(0) is no longer empirically equivalent to the other
theories TN(v)’ (p. 55).
Even though van Fraassen here targets an untenable version of the syntactic view
(namely, the old logical positivist view that theoretical sentences are reduced to obser-
vational sentences), and the syntactic view may well have its own resources to distin-
guish between versions of Newtonian theory: I agree that the syntactic notion of empir-
ical equivalence is prima facie stronger, because of the difference between identity and
isomorphism—and coincides with my own interpretation of Quine’s notion, at the begin-
ning of this Section.18 Thus van Fraassen seems to be making the same distinction that
18Van Fraassen (2014), in his reply to Halvorson (2012), has recently emphasised the importance of
interpretation for questions of equivalence: he always took interpretative notions to be properly accounted
for in the semantic conceptions of theories. As such, this does not contradict any of the above, which
explicitly takes interpretation into account. Notice, furthermore, that van Fraassen nowhere says that
‘empirically equivalent interpretations should have the same truth values’ or something of the sort. Indeed,
he explicitly says that ‘if we believe of a family of theories that are all empirically adequate, but each
goes beyond the phenomena, then we are still free to believe that each is false’ (1980: p. 47). Thus
the empirical adequacy (and hence equivalence) of theories is independent of their truth. Furthermore,
van Fraassen (2014) is concerned with Halvorson’s discussion of theoretical equivalence more than with
empirical equivalence.
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I made earlier in this Section. (I disagree that this is a reason to regard either criterion
as superior, as I will explain below.)
Finally, let me add a word about why duality (and induced duality) are the right
kinds of isomorphism here, i.e. why I am allowed to generalise van Fraassen’s relatively
simple isomorphisms to dualities. To see this, one needs to specify what is the relevant
‘isomorphism’: for isomorphism is a notion that is well-defined only relative to a given
structure. For scientific theories, the natural isomorphisms to consider are those that
relate their structures. And since van Fraassen (1980, 1989) presents scientific theories
in terms of states and quantities, with their corresponding interpretation maps (see also
1970: pp. 329, 334-335), the relevant isomorphisms between scientific theories should
relate these structures. But this is precisely what the duality and induced duality maps
do: they map the states and the quantities, the values of the quantities. In other words,
once one has agreed that a theory is formulated as a structured set of states, quantities,
and dynamics, a principled definition of an isomorphism of theories (and models) should
preserve those structures—and duality is such a principled isomorphism. In this light,
it is no coincidence that van Fraassen’s and the Schema’s verdicts about the empirical
equivalence of Newtonian theory coincide. Thus the claim that dual theories can be taken
to be empirically equivalent is a natural (although perhaps unexpected!) application of
van Fraassen’s semantic criterion.
I have discussed van Fraassen (1980) in some detail because of its wide influence,
and to show how his notion of empirical equivalence applies to dualities. I submit that
the textual evidence leaves no doubt that my interpretation of dual theories as being
empirically equivalent, through an induced duality map d˜, is a straightforward application
not just of van Fraassen’s general notion of empirical equivalence, but indeed of his main
motivation for developing a semantic account: namely, that he thinks that such an account
must make isomorphic theories empirically equivalent—as his discussion of Newton’s and
Maxwell’s theories, and his criticisms of the syntactic conception, show.
4.2 Applying the syntactic notion of empirical equivalence
As to question (B) above: I claim that the syntactic criterion of empirical equivalence
can similarly be applied in a more liberal way, like the semantic criterion. And it will not
even be necessary to modify Quine’s criterion of empirical equivalence from Section 2; all
we need is to apply it to a new pair of theories, where a new theory is generated through
a non-standard interpretation of the bare theory.
Let me motivate why we would want to do this, using the example of the quark-gluon
plasma, discussed at the end of Section 3. There, the five-dimensional black hole was used
to answer empirical questions about a plasma that could not be answered using QCD.
The five-dimensional black hole, plus a suitable “translation”, made this possible. And
this scientific practice is justified by my analysis of empirical equivalence. If dual theories
could not be taken to be empirically equivalent, dualities would be of little interest for
the practicing physicist. It is precisely the fact that one of the dual theories can be used
in a different context to make a prediction that is otherwise unattainable, that makes
dualities scientifically valuable.
This kind of isomorphism can be introduced on the syntactic conception just as it is
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T1
d←→ T2yj1 yj2
O1
t←→ O2
Figure 3: Translation, t, between observational conditionals, O1 and O2, on the syntactic view.
on the semantic conception, by a suitable translation between the sets of observational
conditionals, O1 and O2, of the two theories (see Figure 3). If one finds a translation map
t that, added to the syntactic interpretation map j1 : T1 → O2, makes true the very same
sentences as j2 : T2 → O2, so that t ◦ j1 = j2 ◦ d, then the two theories are rendered
empirically equivalent. In other words, T1, with the non-standard interpretation t ◦ j1, is
empirically equivalent to T2. Thus we do not need to change Quine’s criterion: we rather
change the theory, by giving it a new (and innovative!) interpretation.19
But also, these reinterpretations are not forbidden: for notice that nobody said that we
had to stick to a single interpretation in order for a theory to make empirical predictions.
Although bare theories may have intended interpretations, assigned to them by history
and convenience, nothing in the Quinean notion of empirical equivalence prevents us from
generating new theories by reinterpreting the old ones, thus extending the predictive power
of a bare theory. Indeed, the exercise is not motivated by philosophical speculation, but by
scientific practice. The use of this flexibility in explaining heavy-ion collisions illustrates
the scientific importance of the procedure.
Notice that, as on the semantic view, the interpretation thus obtained is non-trivial,
and it need not always exist: we are using the theory T1 to produce the observational
sentences O2 of theory T2, by giving a non-standard interpretation to T1.
Let me briefly discuss the obvious objection: how can a hot lattice be empirically
equivalent to a cold lattice? A thermometer surely ought to tell the difference?
But this objection can only be made if we are allowed to do measurements on the
system “from the outside”, i.e. measurements that are not modelled by the theory. If the
measurements are modelled by the theory, then empirical equivalence by definition trans-
lates the measurements, which are ordinary physical interactions (see the end of Section 2).
Namely, the answer to the objection is the one given to the sceptic of length contraction in
special relativity, who asks: if two observers in relative motion make different predictions
about the length of a body, surely a measuring stick can say who of them is right? But
of course the measuring sticks are themselves contracted under a Lorentz transformation,
19My proposed use of Quine’s notion of empirical equivalence, allowing ourselves to generate a theory
with a new interpretation from the consideration of the induced duality map, is in the same spirit in
which Lutz claims that the syntactic and semantic conceptions do not differ so much after all. For
one of the main problems of the syntactic view is that it seemed highly language-dependent (and van
Fraassen aimed to solve this problem by moving to a language-independent semantic view). Now Lutz
(2017: pp. 324-326) follows Glymour and others in looking for more liberal criteria, such as definitional
equivalence, that can make different theories ‘mutually interpretable’. Thus my proposal is that one may
consider this to hold not just for the notion of theoretical equivalence, but also for empirical equivalence.
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and so seemingly irreconciliable claims turn out to be empirically equivalent after all. For
a discussion of this argument for dualities, see Dieks et al. (2015: pp. 209-210).
Agreed: it is of course not mandatory to take dual theories to be empirically equiva-
lent. This is clearest in the syntactic conception, where a theory and its dual can always
be interpreted according to their ordinary interpretations, rather than non-standard ones.
And the duals then simply disagree about empirical matters. But also on the semantic
view this is possible, by adopting non-isomorphic interpretations. This parallels the dis-
tinction between external vs. internal interpretations in Dieks et al. (2015) and De Haro
(2016, 2017): namely, interpretations that “start from the duality” vs. interpretations
that are “independent of the duality”. For more on when it is more appropriate to adopt
one sort of interpretation or the other, see De Haro (2016).
Let me briefly compare my discussion of empirical equivalence to other authors who
write about dualities. While the recent philosophical discussion of dualities has focussed
on the analysis of theoretical equivalence,20 it has for the most part assumed that dual the-
ories are empirically equivalent without an explicit analysis of the conception of empirical
equivalence used.21 My analysis has aimed to make explicit that the verdict of empirical
equivalence of dual theories, on the standard conceptions of empirical equivalence, is not
automatic: for it required, in the syntactic view, adopting a non-standard interpretation
of a bare theory. And in the semantic view, it involved an unexpected application of
the isomorphism criterion, which is widened from the familiar cases to theories whose
structures look very different. Furthermore, we have seen that such empirical equivalence
is not mandatory.
5 Conclusion
Both the semantic and the syntactic views allow for special applications that render dual
theories empirically equivalent: although the way in which they do this is slightly different.
In van Fraassen’s semantic conception, duals are rendered empirically equivalent be-
cause his notion of empirical equivalence has ‘isomorphism’ built into it—and duality is a
natural notion of isomorphism between scientific theories. In this way, two dual bare theo-
ries are rendered empirically equivalent under their standard interpretations. This notion
of empirical equivalence is of course faithless to meanings, as van Fraassen admits—but
this allows him to conclude that different versions of Newtonian mechanics are empiri-
cally equivalent, even though they cannot all be true. And this of course articulates an
important practice in science.
On the syntactic view, two dual bare theories are usually empirically inequivalent
under their standard interpretations, but are rendered empirically equivalent if one of the
theories is given a non-standard interpretation, i.e. using a translation map induced from
the duality. This does not require changing Quine’s criterion of empirical equivalence: it
only requires endowing the same bare theory with a new interpretation. In this way, the
20For example, Matsubara (2013: p. 487) and Read (2016: p. 213) take empirical equivalence as a
necessary condition for two theories to be dual.
21Read and Møller-Nielsen (2018: §3.1) cite van Fraassen’s notion of empirical equivalence.
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same bare theory can be put to different uses, including in other domains of phenomena
than it was originally developed for.
And this move is motivated by the use of dualities in the predictions for the RHIC
experiments on quark-gluon plasma: and by many other such uses of dualities by physicists
in solving problems in current theoretical physics.
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